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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper characterizes and measures the contribution of social capital to the 
performance of 50 agroenterprises in Colombia.  Using qualitative analysis we document how 
social capital performs a variety of functions in firms, including providing access information via 
networks of contacts, reducing transactions costs in contracting via trust, and sustaining capacity 
for collective action.    To estimate social capitals contribution to firm structure and 
performance, quantitative indicators of firm-level use of social capital are developed based on 
the number and strength of relationships that firms maintain.  Econometric analysis finds that 
firm-level returns to relationships are high, higher than to physical or human capital.    The 
results suggests that while firms can increase their economic performance by investing in social 
capital, institutional and technological innovations that ameliorate the effects of the market 
failures that lead to use of social relationships for business purposes could also improve both 
equity and efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the process of agro-industrialization4 has transformed 
agriculture and rural communities in many parts of Latin America, more so than in any other part 
of the world (FAO, 1997).   As a result of demographic change, increasing regional and global 
incomes, and structural adjustment and market liberalization programs undertaken in many LAC 
countries, agro-industrialization has expanded far beyond the traditional agro-export crops 
(Reardon et al, 1999).  Today both traditional commodities and new crops are being produced, 
processed, and marketed both domestically and internationally with the participation of national 
and multinational agribusiness companies.    Promoting agro-industrial development is a policy 
goal for many governments in both developing and developed countries (Barham et al, 1992; 
Carter et al, 1995; CEPAL/GTZ/FAO, 1998). 
It is widely believed that agro-industrialization can contribute to rural economic and 
social development.  Economic development impacts would stem from the value added by post-
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harvest activities, and its multiplier effects within rural communities. The social contributions are 
less well defined but appear to relate both to increased incomes and to the increased integration 
of individuals and groups both within agro-industrial firms and along the supply chains.  In 
Colombia, spillovers from this economic activity are expected to promote social cohesion in 
rural communities.(Lafourcade, 2002, sec.A).   
The principal hypothesis of this study is that while strengthened social capacity may be 
an outcome of agroindustrialization, social capital is also likely to be a key input into the process.   
Individuals and groups who can work collaboratively and establish and maintain both trust-based 
relationships and networks of contacts will have an advantage over their competitors who cannot.  
The reason is that agro-enterprise firms compete in complex supply chains that are technically 
demanding, information intensive and require coordination among different actors and different 
stages of the process.  Where markets fail and transactions costs are high, social capital can make 
a significant contribution to firm performance by providing access to information and reducing 
the costs of contracting and coordination.  Failure to recognize and explicitly incorporate the 
concept of social capital as an input into agro-industrialization may limit the effectiveness of 
programs and projects that promote agro-industrialization as a means to alleviate rural poverty. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes theoretical and empirical 
evidence on the role of social capital in firm performance. Section 3 describes the context of the 
study and the data.  Section 4 presents the results of the qualitative analysis of the functions that 
social capital performs in agro-enterprises. In section 5, quantitative measures of firm level use 
of social capital are identified and analyzed, and the economic returns to social capital are 
estimated.  Section 6 summarizes and concludes with recommendations for policy and further 
research. 
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2. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Coleman (1988) formulated the concept of social capital as way to bridge the gap 
between the sociologists explanation of human behavior as determined by social factorsnorms 
and social obligationsand the economists assumption of rational self-interest.    According to 
Coleman,   the function identified by the concept of social capital is the value of these aspects 
of the social structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests 
(Coleman, 1988, p. s101).   While many other studies have focused on community level 
outcomes and define social capital as a community level public-good (Putnam, 1993a,b; 
Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Helliwell, 1996; Krishna and Uphoff, 1998), Coleman conceived of 
social capital as something used by individuals to further their own personal objectives.  His 
objective was to explain just what it is about social relations that can constitute a useful capital 
resource for individuals (p. s102).  Social capital may be embedded in society rather than in any 
one individual, but it is given value by the individuals and organizations that use it to further 
their individual or collective interests.   
Colemans conception of social capital made it very clear that social capital may not be 
evenly distributed within the community, and that while it should generally have positive 
benefits for those who have access to and use it, the consequences maybe different for society as 
a whole (Sandefur and Laumann, 1998; Edwards and Foley, 1998).  Sandefur and Laumann 
argue that a specific form of social capital may vary in the degree to which its benefits 
generalize to different kinds of goals, and how forms that are valuable for some purposes may be 
a liability for other purposes (p. 1043).  This suggests that understanding the contribution of 
social capital to economic and social development will require looking at its role in individual 
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and firm level decisions.   Until we have a better understanding of this, we will not be able to 
address the important policy question of how social capital can be constructed so as to enhance 
the quality and sustainability of livelihoods (Bebbington, 1999, p. 2039).   
Coleman clearly distinguishes between the specific form that social capital takes and the 
role that it plays, allowing the concept to be useful in a variety of contexts.  For example, he 
notes that groups often play an important role in revolutionary movements, however the specific 
characteristics of the groups vary widely, from secret study groups in South Korea to workers 
cells in Tsarist Russia.  The fact that social capital is defined by its function not its form is useful 
because it accounts for different outcomes at the level of individual actors while at the same 
time allowing researchers to  make the micro-to-macro transitions without elaborating the social 
structural details through which this occurs (Coleman, 1988, p. s101).  Nevertheless, Coleman 
identifies three general forms that social capital might take: 1) obligations, expectations and 
trustworthiness of structures; 2) information channels, and 3) norms and effective sanctions.    
In one of the few empirical analyses of social capital in the context of agro-enterprises, 
Fafchamps and Minten (1999), in a study of agricultural traders, conclude that in a world with 
transactions costs, the returns to social capital may be as high or higher than the returns to labor 
or to physical or human capital. Their definition of social capital is essentially social networks.  
Barr (2000a), in a study of small-scale manufacturing entrepreneurs in Ghana, looks at the 
contribution of networks of business-related contacts to firm performance in the context of 
endogenous growth theory.  She finds support for her hypothesis that contacts contribute to 
technical information flows among enterprises, and that these flows not only make a positive 
contribution to individual firm performance but generate spillovers to other firms as well.   
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Barr (2000b) also investigates the possibility that networks of contacts can provide the 
basis for other types of firm level benefits beyond technical information flows. An analysis of 
why Ghanaian entrepreneurs valued their networks found that they reduce search and contract 
enforcement costs through information sharing. Networks can also be the basis of collective 
action, though this was not common and usually involved only a subset of network members.  
For this reason she hesitates to call networks groups because they operate in a very decentralized 
way.  She also finds that there is high variation across entrepreneurs and that the specific 
environments in which they operate greatly affect the utility of social networks.  
In this study, we seek to build on this work by addressing two main questions: 1) how is 
social capital important to rural agroenterprises? and 2) how important is social capital?  The 
first question is addressed through a primarily qualitative analysis of the functions that social 
capital performs within individual enterprises.  The goals of this analysis are to document the use 
of social capital by firms, to clarify what it means to use social relations for economic purposes, 
and to suggest possible quantitative measures for firm-level use of social capital.  The second 
question is tackled using quantitative methods to estimate the economic returns to social capital 
in terms of firm productivity. 
Using multiple methods is important because a limitation of much of the quantitative 
social capital literature is that while it identifies interesting and statistically significant 
relationships between variables, the causality and the policy implications are often not clear 
(Wong Kwok-fu, 2001).  By integrating qualitative analysis of the functions of social capital 
with quantitative analysis of the how social capital affects firms structure and performance, we 
can better interpret results and arrive at conclusions with clear development implications.   
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3. STUDY CONTEXT AND DATA 
The data for the analysis come from a sample of 50 firms in five regions of Colombia: the 
Caribbean Coast near the cities of Sincelejo, Sucre and Montería, Córdoba;  Eastern Antioquia; 
Ubaté, Cundinamarca; Vèlez, Santander; and the region around Manizales, Caldas in the coffee 
growing region.  The zones were identified because they are all centers of agro-industrial 
activity; yet differ in their historical/cultural dynamics and institutional contexts.  In the absence 
of a business census, firms were identified using information provided by the local chambers of 
commerce, where all businesses are legally obligated to register, and by other key informants.  
The sample was selected to represent small and medium-sized enterprises. Some general 
characteristics of the agro-enterprises are presented in Table 1.  
For each firm, in-depth, open-ended interviews were conducted with the owner/manager 
about firm history, business practices, decision-making and conflict resolution processes, 
relations with other individuals and organizations, and important influences, challenges and 
opportunities facing the firm.    The purpose of these questions was to get an idea of the specific 
context of the business, and document examples of how social capital might have been used to 
further firm objectives. 
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Table 1--Selected characteristics of the sample rural agroenterprises, by region (n=50) 
 
 Caribbean 
Coast (n=10) 
Antioquia 
(n=10) 
Ubaté 
(n=10) 
Vèlez 
(n=10) 
Coffee Zone 
(n=10) 
Economic 
activities (# of 
firms) 
Cassava (4), 
dairy (3), 
wood (2), 
sugar cane 
(1) 
Fruits (4), 
vegetables 
(2), dairy (1), 
sugar cane 
(1), animal 
feed (1), 
medicinal 
plants (1)  
Dairy (10) Fruit 
(10) 
Fruits (5), 
Sugar cane 
(1), agro-
tourism (1), 
plantains (1), 
vegetables 
(1), wood 
Percent that 
are member-
owned (coops, 
associations) 
40 30 0 0 10 
Average 
number of 
employees  
12.2  
(7.1) 
18.2  
(9.1) 
6.7  
(12.7) 
6.5  
(4.5) 
25.2  
(22) 
Average 
number of 
skilled workers  
4.8  
(6.1) 
4.0  
(4.4) 
.3  
(.67) 
.3  
(.67) 
5.7  
(7.8) 
Average age of 
firm (years) 
10  
(5.7) 
8.3 
(3.2) 
21.3 (14.5) 23.6 
(16.6) 
8.5  
(5.8) 
Average 
annual value of 
production 
(USD) 
41,489 
(25,285) 
237, 144 
(314,525) 
473,245 
(1,242,254) 
63,200 
(64,211) 
459,111 
(546,827) 
Average value 
of capital 
equipment  
86,435 
(163,138) 
64,115 
(79,017) 
74,720 
(147,635) 
14,124 
(9,770) 
145,200 
(229,996) 
Percent with 
negative 
environmental 
impact 
50 0 0 0 30 
Where averages are reported, standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
At the same time, quantitative data on a range of demographic and economic 
characteristics of firms and their owner/managers were also collected.   Detailed social and 
demographic information about the owner/managers includes education, work experience, 
participation in different types of groups, and size and diversity of networks of contacts (Table 
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2).   At the firm level, data were collected on labor, capital and value of production (Table 1), as 
well as the firms relationships with other individuals and organizations (Table 6).  We used 
Venn diagrams to identify relationships and rank them according to their strength.  Subsequently, 
a series of questions with coded responses was asked about each specific relationship.  Key 
informants provided information about firm performance and impact, and about community 
social and economic tendencies. 
Table 2--Social and demographic characteristics of firm owner/managers (n=50)  
 
 Caribbean 
Coast 
Eastern 
Antioquia 
Ubaté Vèlez Coffee Zone 
Education 
Index (from 
1 (low) to 5 
(highest) 
1.5 2.9 2.6 1.6 4.0 
Years in 
current 
position 
9.1 5.7 18 18.9 5.6 
% with 
experience 
outside the 
region 
78 78 60 70 50 
% with prior 
experience 
in industry 
90 55 70 100 50 
Index of 
total number 
of personal 
contacts* 
11.5 Na 19.9 19.8 20.9 
Index of 
diversity of 
personal 
contacts* 
7.6 Na 10.4 9.9 10.2 
# of 
groups** 
2.6 (3.2) 1.9 (2.5) .3 (.48) 1.4 (1.6) 2.5 (.97) 
* Following Barr (2000a), respondents were asked how many people they knew in a range of categories including 
farmers, intermediaries, business people in came business, business people in larger businesses, politicians, public 
employees, technical assistance providers.  Responses were coded using 4 categories, very many, many, a few and 
very few.  The variable index of total number of personal contacts is the sum of the coded responses for all types 
of contacts. The variable index of diversity of contacts is the number of types of contacts that the firm has. 
** number of groups include owners membership in religious, social, political, financial, and industry groups 
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4.  HOW IS SOCIAL CAPITAL IMPORTANT? FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN 
RURAL AGROENTERPRISES 
 
This section presents and analyzes examples of how firms were observed to use social 
relations as an input into production.   Social capital was expected to perform three general 
functions within firms.  The first was to obtain information via broad networks of personal 
contacts maintained by firm owner/managers.  The second function of social capital was to 
reduce uncertainty and monitoring costs by transacting with trusted individuals and 
organizations.   Finally, we expected that some firms would be able to benefit by engaging in 
collective action, and that social capital would influence whether collective action emerged and 
was sustained.   
4.1  INFORMATION NETWORKS  
 
Firms used their information networks for four main purposes, to identify and contact 
clients, to access market information, to access inputs, and to obtain technical and financial 
assistance.    
 
Identify and contact potential client. 
In all the regions, the most common use of information networks was to identify and 
make contact with potential clients.   Few firms had never followed up on the reference of a 
relative or friend of a friend.  A quarter of all current clients were initially either friends of 
friends or acquaintances of the firm owner/manager.   In some cases, the use of personal contacts 
was more systematic.  A group of investors in Cartagena that owns a dairy products firm uses its 
contacts in urban areas for market development while a trusted farm administrator runs the 
production facility.   A public-private firm that processes and markets horticultural products was 
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founded with active support of the leaders of Medellins business community, including 
managers of several important supermarket chains.  Firms also use friendships to get retail 
clients.  Thanks to the owners friendship with bus drivers, one cheese factory in Ubaté is a 
frequent rest stop for long distance buses traveling north from Bogotá.   
Personal contacts are particularly important in opening doors, especially at large chain 
supermarkets. However it appears that they are not sufficient to maintain clients when firms are 
deficient in terms of quality, volume or price.  In several cases clients obtained by personal 
contacts were later lost because firms did not meet requirements.  Sometimes, this appears to be 
due to the lack of a good relationship between the firm and the client.  A good example is a fruit 
processor that obtained its main client, a well-known fast food chain, through a personal contact.  
The firm fills the orders on time, however it has made no effort to follow up with the client to 
assess their satisfaction with the firm and its products.  Our interview with the client revealed 
they were about to drop the agro-enterprise for a lower-cost competitor.   Since the agro-
enterprise is not aware of this situation, they can do nothing to prevent it.    
 
Accessing market information    
 
Many firms also reported using their networks of personal contacts to obtain information 
about markets, prices, and products.  While there are a few cases of purely personal relationships 
yielding these kinds of benefits, it was more common to see firms getting this information from 
other actors in the supply chain, demonstrating the multipurpose nature of supply chain 
relationships.  Wholesalers, distributors and even other producers in regional markets were 
frequently mentioned as good sources of information about prices and market trends.  They also 
provide firm-specific information.  In Antioquia, a regional distributor suggested that a 
struggling sugar cane processor begin producing a powdered version of its product, which was 
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an instant success.   In the case of one fruit-processing firm, a friend who was an employee of a 
supermarket chain gave the founder the idea to base a firm on a specific fruit.   Business or 
industry associations can also be good sources of information, provided that their focus is not too 
broad.  One owner of a wood-processing firm commented that he benefited more from 
associations with other firms in his industry than from a local small-business owners 
association. 
 
Access to inputs 
Over half of the agricultural producers who supply firms with raw materials were either 
friends of friends or acquaintances of the owners at the time they began supplying the firms, as 
were nearly a third of non-agricultural input suppliers.   Several former employees of 
agribusiness or technical assistance organizations founded businesses built on contacts they had 
made with producers and other suppliers.  Again, these relationships provide information and 
open doors, but are not sufficient to guarantee good long term working relations.  A dairy 
processor had good contacts with farmers from a previous job as a technician.   Nonetheless, 
until he was able to prove that his firm would be a reliable buyer of milk, producers often failed 
to deliver products and had to pay price premiums to assure a steady milk supply.   Again, initial 
contacts open doors, but performance and trust cement relationships. 
 
Technical and financial support 
Several firms had connections in governmental or non-governmental agencies who 
facilitated access to financial, technical and management support.  Contacts in universities were 
a good source of technical assistance.  A firm owner who is also a politician and community 
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leader was able to use his contacts to find out about opportunities for technical and social 
assistance both for producers associated with the firm and for their communities in general.   
Here again, personal contacts open doors however larger benefits can come with 
consolidation of the relationships. There are several cases where initial contacts between an 
institution such as an NGO or a government agency charged with providing support to agro-
industries have, over time, become trust-based relationships that permit the firm to get access to 
a range of benefits beyond the initial services offered by the support  institution. A common 
example is a company that starts by attending some kind of training offered by an institution, and 
later gains the institutions support in the formulation and even financing of projects. 
 
4.2   TRUST 
 
Trust is often an essential element in business relationships.  If individuals or firms can 
trust each other, they can spend fewer resources on monitoring and enforcing contracts. Among 
the firms in the survey, trust plays an important role in facilitating interaction with others actors 
in the production chain, helping firms to maintain relationships with clients, reduce the cost of 
assuring producer compliance; manage crises; and obtain credit. 
  
Maintaining relationships with clients 
As mentioned above, good relationships can help firms to recognize and respond to the 
clients needs. They also permit the client to understand and take into consideration the 
circumstances of the firm.    A relationship of mutual trust and respect allowed a medicinal plants 
cooperative to retain an important client in spite of the fact that it cant always fulfill the clients 
stated volume requirements.  The owner of a woodworking shop in the Caribbean coast hired 
  
13 
 
 
employees to do the woodworking so that he could go out and get clients. The reason is that he 
feels that hired salespeople cannot establish the same strong relationships with clients that the 
owner can.    
Reducing the cost of monitoring contract compliance 
Trust-based relationships with clients essentially can reduce their enforcement costs. 
Agro-enterprise firms look for the same benefits with their own suppliers.  Most firms report that 
they have strong relationships with agricultural producers who supply their raw materials, even 
though they dont have written or even verbal contracts with them. Just as cooperatives 
distinguish between member and non-member producers, some investor-owned firms distinguish 
between trusted producers and the rest using the terms associated and non-associated producers.   
Strong relationships with producers mean that firms can be assured that producers will 
comply with their commitments to supply given quantities and qualities on given dates. 
Vegetable and dairy firms report that with trusted producers they can reduce or even eliminate 
quality and residue checks that are required for other producers.   This was also important in 
transportation services, where firms need to be certain that the containers carrying their products 
had not been used recently to transport agrochemicals or other hazardous substances.  It should 
be pointed out that this trust might only be useful in less formal segments of the market.  In the 
coffee zone, where some firms are producing organic products for export, all producers, no 
matter how trustworthy, must sign legal contracts with firms certifying that their production is 
organic.  
 It is important not to assume that a close personal relationship automatically means 
confidence.  A few firms reported robberies by family members. Similarly, friendships can be 
used to take advantage of the firm.   The ex-manager of the cooperative signed a contract with a 
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friend who is a fruit and vegetable distributor in Bogotá.  The deal is very favorable to the 
distributor at the expense of the cooperative.   
 
Managing crises  
Several firms say they maintain close ties with others in the same business so that they 
can manage crises such as power outages or transportation failures.  These problems can be 
devastating for firms with highly perishable products, prompting competing firms to establish 
reciprocal arrangements to share equipment in the event of an emergency.    
 
Accessing credit 
Several firms get credit on the basis of trust-based relationships.  In many cases, 
associated producers or cooperative members agree to receive delayed payments for their 
products.  Several firms reportedly obtained credit from family members because the banks 
rejected them. One owner received credit from a former boss when the family rejected him.  In 
Antioquia two firms, one non-profit and one for profit, received loans directly from some 
members or associated producers.  In one case, a producer let a private company use his land to 
secure a loan. 
 
4.3 COLLECTIVE ACTION 
In the 50 case study enterprises, collective action contributed to firm performance in eight 
different ways, more than double the number of functions performed by either networks or trust.  
The majority of collective action takes place in relations with producers, either in their capacity 
as members of a cooperative or as associated producers of an agroenterprise.  As expected, 
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collective action is more common in cooperatives and associations, however it is also found 
among private firms.   
 
Collective commercialization  
One common use of collective action is to permit the collective commercialization of 
products, especially of high-value fruits and vegetables.  Sometime it is limited to post-harvest 
activities such as grading and packing, however in general collective commercialization is a 
main activity of the firm.  The advantage of joint selling is to obtain higher prices by reducing 
intermediation costs and/or delivering greater volume. Most firms that report collective 
commercialization are cooperatives or associations.  In general the higher the degree of product 
transformation, the less likely the firm is to do collective commercialization on a regular basis.    
The ability to sustain collective action is important precisely because the better prices are 
negotiated on the basis of volume.   Fluctuating market prices often mean that at times 
individuals can obtain better prices by violating their commitments to the group and selling 
outside.  
Lack of commitment on the part of producers was frequently mentioned by firm 
owners/managers in the interviews, suggesting that this type of collective action is not easy to 
maintain.  Firms attempted to deal with the collective action problem in a variety of ways.  Some 
address the problem directly via training programs for members on the importance of solidarity 
and mutual benefits of collective action.  Several cooperatives build commitment by hiring 
relatives of coop members or involving members and their families in health, education and 
social development programs.  Although the provision of non-economic benefits is expected for 
the non-profits, in some cases for-profit firms were also observed to provide them.  In the case of 
a private fruit processor, the owner and founder of the business also led a parallel effort 
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community wide on the importance of values and tolerance.  These techniques appeared to be 
working, especially in cases where the decision to do them was internal, or where leadership is 
very strong and dynamic.  
One exception to the cooperative model of collective marketing of products by many 
farmers with little value added is when a small group of firms works together to meet the regular 
demand of a specific client.  This was observed among small woodworking shops in the 
Caribbean coast and among fruit processing firms in the Coffee Zone.  Woodworkers tended to 
produce independently while the fruit processors report sharing information, space, equipment 
and sometimes even workers.    
 
Collective provision of inputs 
Just as selling in large volumes allows firms to negotiate higher output prices, buying in 
bulk can help them obtain lower input prices.   As was the case with collective marketing, 
collective input purchase was most likely to occur among producers or processors who were 
members of a cooperative, though in some cases only subgroups of the members participate.   
The benefits and costs of collective purchasing clearly depend on the product.  In Velez, guava 
processors affiliated with a guava cooperative purchase sugar collectively from a refinery, 
however they all buy fruit individually from intermediaries and report problems with unfair 
competition.   
While a benefit in itself, we often found that firms used collective provision of inputs 
such as technical assistance, machinery, agrochemicals, or in one case, a community 
supermarket, to strengthen the commitment of individuals to a group whose main activity is 
something else, such as collective marketing.  In these cases, the firms may absorb the 
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transactions costs of purchasing goods collectively as an expense of maintaining collective action 
in their primary activity.   
Another way that firms can collectively access inputs is through exchange among 
members. In two cases, one association and one cooperative, the members maintain seed 
exchange networks among themselves so that they can always be assured of a supply of quality 
seed.  In both cases, the products are uncommonguava (which is usually collected rather than 
planted) and medicinal plantsso seed supply could be a problem. 
 
Collective monitoring and enforcement 
Firms also reported that they relied on collective monitoring and enforcement of norms 
and standards within the organization. The physical proximity and history that many members of 
coops, producers associations or processing firms share can reduce the costs of monitoring 
whether individuals are fulfilling their obligations to the firm.  This is especially important in an 
industry like agriculture where production risk can be high and monitoring costly.   
In both cooperatives and individually-owned firms with associated producers, collective 
decisions were made to either punish or, in extreme cases, sever ties with individuals for 
noncompliance.  In most cases the decision to act on noncompliance is slow in coming and is 
usually only taken when things were in very bad shape.  In a few cases, however, collective 
monitoring and enforcement was done proactively, with the goal of enhancing quality. One 
cooperative started a program in which more experienced members support new ones to make 
sure they are capable of attaining and maintaining the required quality standards.  A private firm 
hired technicians to visit farmers and provide technical support, something that also allowed 
them to monitor practices on farm.  This firm says that it achieved a reduction in rejection rates 
of its vegetables by buyers, however it acknowledges that it transferred the collective action 
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problem from the producers to the technicians.  The firm provides its employees with some 
collective benefits, such as a cow that they jointly feed on organic waste from the factory, which 
could be seen as efforts to strengthen the ties among them. 
Unlike Barr, we did not find examples of firms using broader networks for collective 
monitoring and enforcement.  Not a single firm reported dealing with non-compliance by 
involving outsiders or by informing or threatening to inform others about the problem.  Over half 
of the firm owners said that in a case of non-compliance they would quietly terminate the 
relationship and 36 percent said they would try to work things out themselves.  While the 
hypothetical nature of this question may make it difficult to answer reliably, these responses are 
consistent with the tense socio-political environment of rural Colombia. In a pre-tested version of 
the questionnaire firm owners were asked about cases of conflict rather than non-compliance.  
The basic response was that they did not have conflicts, with the implication being that they 
simply could not allow them to happen.  
 
Collective production or processing 
Several firms reported engaging in some type of collective production or processing.   
Most processing firms, including cooperatives and small family firms, have hierarchical 
organizational structures and strict divisions of labor, however some firms process collectively.  
One milk processing plant in Ubaté ran into financial difficulties and is now simply pooling 
family labor resources to keep the firm afloat.  In a jam and jelly business, a handful of women 
do all the fruit processing collectively and share equally in the benefits.  The firm does not 
appear to be very profitable, and has lost over 80 percent of its members over the past few years, 
in spite of being located in a community with a long history of community social activism.    
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Several agroenterprises mention collective agricultural production.  Members of one 
multi-activity cooperative generally produce individually, however they have planted parcels 
collectively on several occasions.   The first time they reported doing it was because they were 
introducing a new product and they wanted to share the risks. Later, they got involved in a 
participatory research project where they were trying new varieties and practices. Again, 
collective production allowed them to pool the risks of the experimentation.     
 
Collective financing 
Collective action is also evident in the way many enterprises are financed.  In a more 
systematic example of the delayed producer payments mentioned in the section on trust, the 
ability of some cooperatives and other firms to survive is based on producerscollective 
willingness to let other obligations be paid first.  In a cassava-drying cooperative in the 
Caribbean coast, members turn their production over to the cooperative, which then processes 
and sells it and uses the income to buy product from non-members. With the money from the 
processing and sale of the non-members cassava, the members are paid. 
Since member-owned enterprises such as cooperatives are often disadvantaged in credit 
markets, public and private institutions that support agro-industry often offer them loans on 
favorable terms.  Three private firms in the sample are considering or are in the process of 
becoming cooperatives for no other reason than to get access to cheap credit.  An appropriate 
legal structure that reflects a firms resources and objectives is important to its performance 
(Gonzalez et al, 2002), and programs that distort incentives with regard to choice of 
organizational structure can hurt firms in the long run.    
 
  
20 
 
 
Management of common property 
Two businesses made investments that they hold as common property among members. 
Using a grant from an NGO, a cooperative purchased land that it uses for its experiments.  A 
livestock association owns farm machinery, and the members pay special rates to use it.  Where 
collective action is important is in the design and implementation of norms regarding appropriate 
use and maintenance.     
 
Collusion 
A few firms reported that they got together with other firms in the same business to set 
prices that they would pay for agricultural inputs.  While this benefits the firms involved, it has 
negative consequences for society as a whole.  
 
Collective action in related services 
In several regions, firms report working with other individuals and organizations to 
improve local water supplies, transportation facilities, and communications.  In areas like the 
coffee zone, this is likely related to overall high levels of community organization and capacity. 
In the guava-processing cluster of Velez, current levels of community organization are not high, 
however infrastructure needs are. Several firms are active in community activities.  The firms 
that are involved in these activities tend to have other connections in the public sphere, for 
example owners or members who are involved in community organizations or in local politics. 
 
4.4   PATTERNS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL USE WITHIN AND ACROSS FIRMS 
These examples demonstrate that social relations can perform a variety of economic 
functions within agro-enterprise firms.  To facilitate comparative analysis, we constructed 
indices of the use of different functions of social capital.  Each firm was ranked on a scale of one 
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(lowest) to three (highest) according to how frequently it appeared to use each of the three 
functions.   Use of trust and information functions of social capital appears to be more common 
than use of collective action functions (Table 3).  The information and trust functions were 
unimportant in just over a third of the firms while the collective action functions were 
unimportant in over half of the firms.  While trust based relationships were observed in almost 
two thirds of the cases, only 14 percent of firms showed high incidence of use of trust functions, 
compared to 22 percent for the collective action and information functions.    
Table 3--Importance of different forms of social capital among firms (% de firms) n=50 
 
 Information Trust Collective action 
Low incidence 
(rank = 1) 
38 36 52 
Medium 
incidence 
(rank= 2) 
40 50 26 
High incidence 
(rank= 3) 
22 14 22 
Average (s.d.) 1.84 (.77) 1.78 (.69) 1.7 (.81) 
  
 
Use of individual functions was highly correlated within firms, which means that firms 
that used one function of social capital tended also to use others.  Pairwise correlation analysis 
shows significant correlations between the indices.  Collective action and trust functions were the 
mostly highly correlated (corr=.543, sig=.000) while information and trust were the least 
correlated (corr =.363, sig= .01).   These findings are consistent with the complementarities 
(actual or potential) among functions of social capital that emerged in the qualitative analysis.  
The results of a cluster analysis confirm the high correlation among use of different 
functions of social capital.  Three of the four clusters reveal a hierarchical order across the three 
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component functions (Table 4).  The one exception is a cluster of 4 enterprises that use high 
levels of network social capital and low levels of trust and collective action.   Narayan (1999) 
distinguishes between two functions of social capital, within-group bonding and between-
group bridging functions of social capital.  Firms in this sample tend to both or neither. 
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Table 4--Average value of social capital indicator by group, from cluster analysis 
  
 Collective Action Information Trust 
Group 1 High (n=11) 2.91 2.64 2.64 
Group 2 Medium (n=10) 2.10 1.80 1.60 
Group 3 Low (n=25) 1.12 1.32 1.52 
Group 4 High information (n=4) 1.00 3.00 1.50 
 
Patterns of social capital use varied significantly by zone (Table 5).  The coffee zone 
appears to have the highest levels, which is consistent with the active presence in the region of 
strong, unifying institutions such as the Coffee Growers Federation.  Lowest levels of social 
capital use were found in Ubaté, a region whose organizations are few and weak.  Use of social 
capital also varies by industry.  Dairy and fruit firms are significantly less likely to use collective 
action than firms in other industries.  Fruit firms are also less likely to rely on trust.  
Table 5--Distribution of social capital groups, by zone 
 
 Group 1 
High 
GR2 
Medium 
Group 3 
Low 
Group 4 
High Info 
Only 
Caribbean Coast 1 3 4 2 
Antioquia 4 1 5 0 
Ubate 0 0 8 2 
Velez 0 3 7 0 
Coffee Zone 5 3 1 0 
X2 =27.3 df 12 sig =.007 
 
However because of the clusters of dairy in Ubaté and guava processing in Vèlez, these industry-
level differences probably reflect regional characteristics as well as industry conditions.  There is 
no systematic relationship between social capital use and either total income or income per 
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worker.  Firms whose owners/managers belong to many groups in their personal lives are 
significantly more likely to use social capital than those who dont (corr .337, sig =.018).    
 
5.  HOW IMPORTANT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL? QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
IMPACT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON FIRM STRUCTURE AND INCOME 
The previous section described ways in which firms used social capital to achieve 
specific objectives.  The results of that analysis leave no doubt that social relations can be 
economically useful to firms. They also suggest a variety of ways in which firms can make better 
use of their social capital.  What they do not tell us is how important social capitals 
contributions are to the firms bottom line, especially relative to those of other inputs.  Until we 
know this we cannot say whether firms can benefit by increasing their investments in social 
capital.   
 
5.1  MEASURING FIRMS USE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
The social capital literature and the examples provided in the previous section suggest 
that social capital is located in personal relationships.  This suggests that an empirical measure of 
a firms use of social capital might be developed based on data about the relationships that a firm 
maintains.      
The firms in the sample maintain relationships with a variety of actors.  The most basic 
relationships are those with employees, agricultural producers, non-agricultural input suppliers 
and clients.  Many firms also report relationships with a variety of other actors such as federal, 
state and local government agencies, NGOs, banks and other financial institutions, universities, 
industry organizations, intermediaries, public employees, politicians, and community 
organizations.  The average firm has 12.5 relationships, ranging from four to 23 (Table 6). The 
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total number of relationships varies significantly by region, with firms in Vèlez and the coffee 
zone having the most and those in Ubaté having the least.  With the exception of horticultural 
processing and marketing firms, which tend to maintain a high number of relationships, there are 
no significant differences among firms by industry. 
 
Table 6--Number and strength of firm relationships (se in parentheses) 
 
 Total # of 
relationships** 
Total # of strong 
relationships** 
%  of relationships that 
are strong++ 
Caribbean Coast 
(n=10 
10 
(2.8) 
3.3 
(1.3) 
33.7 
(13.2) 
Eastern 
Antioquia (n=10) 
13 
(5) 
7 
(4) 
53.5 
(20.8) 
Ubaté 
(n=10) 
8.2 
(2.5) 
3.4 
(1.2) 
42.7 
(12.9) 
Vèlez (n=10) 15.6 
(1.5) 
7.9 
(1.9) 
51.5 
(4.7) 
Coffee Zone 
(n=10) 
15.7 
(4.3) 
9.2 
(2.4) 
59.5 
(8.3) 
Total (n=50) 12.5 
(5) 
6.2 
(3.3) 
48.2 
(15.6) 
** ANOVA significant differences between zones with p<.01 
++ Transformed ANOVA shows significant differences between zones at level p<.01 
 
Relationships can also vary by quality. Of the 12.5 relations that the average firm 
maintains, half are considered to be strong (Table 6). Strength of relationships also varies by 
region.  Sixty percent of the relationships in the coffee zone are considered to be strong, making 
this a region high not only in total relationships but also in strong relationships.  In contrast, on 
the Caribbean coast only a third of a firms relationships are strong, making this the region with 
the fewest strong relationships.   
Different aspects of the relationships may indicate different functions of social capital. 
For example, the total number of relationships that a firm maintains may be associated with 
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network functions, while strength of relationships could reflect trust.  A combination of high 
trust and high number of relationships may signify potential for collective action.   To test 
whether these variables reflect social capital use, we compare them to the results of the indices 
developed on the basis of the qualitative analysis in section 4.   
 A firms total number of relationships is correlated with both its information and 
collective action indices, but not with its trust index (Table 7).   
Table  7--Correlation between structural and functional indices (n=40) 
 
 Total number of 
relationships 
Number of strong 
relationships 
Percent of strong 
relations 
Information .452** .323* .018 
Trust .171 .317* .348** 
Collective Action .301** .422** .281* 
**= sig <.01 * = sig <=.05 
 
The proportion of a firms relationships that are strong is correlated with both the trust and 
collective action indices, but not with the information index.  The number of strong relations that 
a firm maintains is correlated with all social capital functions.  Using the results of the cluster 
analysis, we can see that firms that were observed to use high levels of social capital have more 
and stronger relationships that firms that were observed to use less social capital (Table 8).   
Table 8--Firm relationships by social capital clusters (n=49)  
 
 Total # of 
relationships* 
Total # of strong 
relationships** 
% of relationships 
that are strong 
High (n=10) 15.9 8.7 .55 
Medium (n=10) 13.4 7.0 .49 
Low (n=25) 11.1 5.2 .46 
High information (n=4) 11.5 4.0 .35 
**= sig <.01 * = sig <=.05 
 
  
27 
 
 
These findings support the use of relationship-based variables as measures of social capital 
demand.  However the high correlations between the different forms and functions of social 
capital will make it impossible to distinguish which functions are economically most important.   
 
5.2   DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL USE BY FIRMS 
If the number and strength of a firms relationships reflect its use of social capital, then in 
theory, we should be able to include these variables directly in a production or profit function.  
However theory underlying this econometric analysis assumes that markets are perfect and that 
demand for an input is determined entirely by relative prices and the technology parameters.  In 
this paper, we have hypothesized that use of social capital by firms implies the existence of 
market imperfections, specifically information problems and transactions costs in contracting.  
Therefore we cannot expect the demand for social capital to be independent of supply.   
As a measure of the firms supply of social capital, we use the number of groups to which 
the owner/manager belongs in his or her personal life.  We would not expect such group 
membership to influence firm productivity directly, but it could be expected to do so indirectly 
via facilitating social contacts.  An analysis of the determinants of the number and strength of a 
firms relationships shows that the number of groups that a firm owner belongs to in his or her 
personal life is significantly and positively associated with the total number of relationships that 
his/her firm maintains, controlling for regional and firm-level characteristics (Table 9).   
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Table 9--Results of analysis of determinants of use of social capital  (n=47) (coefficients are 
standardized with intercept 0) 
 
 # Relationships 
(OLS) 
# Strong relationships 
(OLS) 
% relationships strong 
(logistic regression) 
 Standardized coefficients 
Constant *** ***  
Owners Education .288** .107 .033 
# Groups .451*** .429*** .103 
Coop dummy -.231* -.159 .114 
# employees .177 .159 .065 
Dummy for 
experience outside 
the community 
-.035 -.040 -.010 
Caribbean coast 
dummy 
-.451*** -.587*** -.536*** 
Ubate dummy -.594*** -.506*** -.188 
Antioquia dummy -.303** -.117 .096 
Coffee Zone 
dummy 
-.332* -.427 .122 
    
R2 .510 .651 .274 
Durbin Watson 2.006 1.957 1.724 
***= sig <.01 ** = sig <=.05  * = sig <=.10 
 
This result supports the hypothesis that social capital markets are not perfect and that 
firms endowments of social capital determine, in part, their demand for it.   
The results also show that the owners education increases the total number of 
relationships, but not the number of strong relationships.  Cooperatives and associations have 
fewer total relationships than investor owned firms, however there is no difference in number of 
strong relationships.  The size of a firm does not affect the number of relationships, however its 
geographical location does.5   Firms in Velez (excluded dummy in the analysis) tend to have 
higher numbers of relationships than firms in other areas, ceteris paribus.   
                                                 
5 The analysis was also done using industry dummies (milk, fruit, vegetables, sugar and wood) instead of regional 
dummies.  The results show that dairy firms have relatively fewer relationships and fruit firms have relatively more. 
However since Ubaté has a high concentration of dairy firms and Velez has a high concentration of fruit firms, these 
results may reflect regional rather than industry characteristics.  The high correlation between industry and region 
makes it impossible to include both.   Results in terms of the other variables do not change significantly. 
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Neither personal nor firm level variables were significant determinants of the proportion 
of strong relationships that a firm maintains.  The only significant results from that regression is 
that firms on the Caribbean Coast have a lower proportion of strong relationships than firms in 
other regions.         
 
5.3 FIRM LEVEL RETURNS TO SOCIAL CAPITAL   
To assess the contribution of social capital to firm performance, we estimate a 
productivity equation in which revenue per employee is estimated as a function of labor, 
physical, human and social capital, firm-level characteristics and regional dummy variables.  
Because, as shown above, some of these same predictors also influence social capital, a two-
stage estimation procedure is required.  In the first stage, the endogenous social capital variable 
(number of relationships or number of strong relationships) is regressed on the independent 
variables plus the number of groups to which the owner belongs. In the second stage, the 
predicted values of social capital are used to estimate the productivity equation. 
According to the results, the total number of relationships and the number of strong 
relationships that a firm maintains contribute positively and significantly to revenue per 
employee (Table 10).  The percent of relationships that are strong does not.  The elasticity of 
social capital is higher than that of physical capital, meaning that an increase in number of 
relationships has a higher impact on revenue/worker than a proportional increase in machinery.  
The difference is even greater when the increase is in strong relationships.   
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Table 10-- Results of estimation of returns to social capital using 2 stage least squares 
(n=45) 
 Log Annual Revenue per Worker 
(Col pesos) 
  
Constant ** *** 
Log Number of employees -.348* -.360* 
Log Value of Machinery .412** .420** 
Log Number of relationships+  .512*  
Log Number of strong 
relationships+  
 .705* 
Percent of relationships that are 
strong  
.222 -.209 
Education index .178 .177 
Experience outside the community 
dummy 
-.518*** -.561*** 
Coop dummy -.087 -.124 
Caribbean Coast dummy .210 .254 
Antioquia dummy .236 .281. 
Ubaté dummy .731*** .726*** 
Velez dummy .191 .172 
   
R2 .480 .474 
***= sig <.01 ** = sig <=.05  * = sig <=.10 
+ = predicted values from first stage used in second stage estimation 
 
 
Returns to labor were negative, meaning that labor productivity is higher in smaller firms. 
Human capital, as measured by the owner/managers education level, does not appear to 
influence firm productivity directly, but rather indirectly through its influence on social capital.    
In terms of regional differences, firms in Ubaté appear to have significantly higher 
revenue/worker than firms in other regions.  When industry rather than regional dummies are 
used, dairy firms appear to have the highest returns, however this likely reflects the cluster of 
dairy firms in Ubaté.    
An unexpected result of this analysis is the large negative impact that experience outside 
the community has on productivity.  Outside experience was expected to be positive, because it 
represents an opportunity to gain knowledge, experience and make contacts.   One explanation 
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for this finding could be related to the fact that many people who reported changing communities 
did so to escape political violence and may be having trouble integrating into their new 
communities.     
      
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This paper documented how rural agro-enterprises use social relationships to further their 
economic objectives.  Three functions of social capital were observed: providing access to 
information, reducing monitoring costs via trust, and supporting collective action.  The use of the 
different functions of social capital was highly correlated.   Firms that used social relationships 
for one purpose tended also to use them for others.     
To estimate economic returns to social capital, quantitative measures of social capital use 
were developed based on the number of relationships that firms maintained.  The number and 
quality of relationships a firm maintains correlate with functional indices of social capital 
developed on the basis of the qualitative analysis.  Unfortunately, the correlation among use of 
different functions of social capital was also reflected in the structural indicators. This means that 
while we could estimate returns to social capital in general we could not distinguish between 
returns to the different functions performed by social capital. 
Social capital, as measured by the number of relationships, and especially strong 
relationships, that a firm maintains, contributes positively and significantly to its economic 
performance, as measured by revenue per worker.  Investment in social capital yields higher 
returns than in physical capital or labor.  Human capital, as measured by owner/managers 
education, did not affect productivity directly, but rather indirectly via its positive contribution to 
social capital.    
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Several policy implications arise from these results.  According to the econometric 
results, firms can benefit from broadening their networks and by strengthening their existing 
relationships with other actors in the supply chain.  The qualitative analysis cites many examples 
of how this might be done, for example by improving communication and seeking feedback from 
clients, by participating in industry or business associations, or by absorbing transactions costs in 
maintaining collective action among employees, cooperative members, or agricultural producers.    
While building and strengthening firm-level relationships can improve individual firm 
performance, the fact that firms are using personal relationships for professional objectives is a 
sign of market failure.  In theory, social welfare could be improved by ameliorating these failures 
so that firms can compete on the basis of productivity rather than social relationships.  In reality, 
personal relationships will always play a role in economic activity, because information is never 
perfect, contracts are never complete and transactions costs are never zero.  However to the 
extent that technological or institutional innovations can decrease reliance on personal 
relationships and promote the emergence of alternative suppliers and markets for the services 
that are currently provided by social capital, both efficiency and equity are likely to increase.  
The results of this study suggest that careful analysis of which types of business development 
services are currently being provided by which types of relationships and why, would be a good 
place to start an effort to design or implement alternative service provision scheme.  
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